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There have been significant advances in technology and automated 
systems that will eventually see the use of autonomous cars as 
commonplace on our roads. Various systems are already available 
that provide the driver with different levels of decision support. This 
paper highlights the key human factors issues associated with the 
interaction between the user and an autonomous system, including 
assistive decision support and the delegation of authority to the 
automobile. The level of support offered to the driver can range from 
traditional automated assistance, to system generated guidance that 
offers advice for the driver to act upon, and even more direct action 
that is initiated by the system itself without driver intervention. In 
many of these instances the role of the driver is slowly moving 
towards a supervisory role within a complex system rather than one 
of direct control of the vehicle. Different paradigms of interaction are 
considered and focus is placed on the partnership that takes place 
between the driver and the vehicle. Drawing on the wealth of 
knowledge that exists within the aviation domain and research 
literature that examines technology partnerships within the cockpit, 
this paper considers important factors that will assist the automotive 
community to understand the underlying issues of the human and 
their interaction within complex systems. 
 
1 Introduction 
With increasingly congested road networks the existing road infrastructure is 
unsufficient at meeting the growing and future demands that will be placed 
on it. Alongside this is a strong desire to improve efficiency and safety. At the 
centre of accident causality, human error remains a primary concern and 
advances in autonomous systems are hailed as the harbinger of a 
technology that can potentially reduce road fatalities in the future. 
 
In the scope of this paper, the term autonomous system will be defined as 
*Manuscript
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the quality of a technology that is able to perceive information from the 
environment and its ability to act upon it without human intervention. 
 
With the advent of autonomous systems, what better way to reduce human 
error than by removing the human driver? The impetus behind an intiative 
such as this is directly related to the advances in technology that can assist 
in the management of the traffic infrastructure such as intelligent transport 
systems (ITS) or in-vehicle driver assistance systems such as advanced 
driver assistance systems (ADAS).  
 
Several states in the United States (i.e. Nevada, Florida, Michigan and 
California) have reflected this growing appetite by passing legislation that 
allows the introduction of autonomous vehicles onto public highways.  If we 
look across the current range of autonomous cars (Google, Toyota, Nissan, 
BMW, to name but a few) we can see they are all actively researching the 
integration of autonomous decision-making technologies.  Although there are 
differences across these manufacturers in terms of their approach to 
integrating autonomous systems, they all have one thing in common: the 
driver who is ultimately responsible for the vehicle.  
 
With the onset of smaller and cheaper sensors we have seen a migration of 
such technology transfer from other domains into the automotive community. 
For example, the development of Light Radar (LiDAR) was initially designed 
for uses in analysisng meteorological conditions (specifically cloud density). 
Modern LiDAR systems have been used in unmanned ground vehicles for 
detecting obstacles whilst navigating. Perhaps the best-known use of this 
within the automotive domain is the Google ‘Chauffeur’ car with its 
recognisable spinning LiDAR sensor mounted on the roof. At the moment 
this technology is expensive but there are already initiatives to produce a 
more affordable and mainstream version of this technology that could be 
integrated into other cars. 
 
LiDAR is but one of the many different sensor technologies available that 
could be integrated within an intelligent automotive system. Within current 
ADAS functions, ultrasound technology is predominantly used for parking 
and proximity/separation such as adaptive cruise control (ACC), collision 
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warning systems (CWS) and driver awareness functions such as blindspot 
and intersection warning. A number of possible applications that sensors 
may be integrated into the vehicle are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Some available automotive sensor applications  
 
With these technologies employed to assist the driver, if we assume that 
ADAS functions such as intelligent collision warning/avoidance are integrated 
into the wider traffic network, how might these forms of automation actually 
support drivers? 
 
There would appear to be two key ways in which the autonomous system 
could interact with the user.  For example, an autonomous car will be able to 
respond to an event or situation that is perceived by the system as a 
potential threat (using on-board sensors) and either advise the driver on the 
appropriate action to take and place authority on the driver to respond; or the 
car will be authorised to take action on behalf of the driver in order to avoid 
an accident.  Both cases highlight the need for a framework of delegating 
authority between the user and the system so that future solutions are 
developed with a common user-centred perspective.  
   
2 Automation and human performance 
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The implication of incorporating an element of autonomy within a system 
predicates the delegation of authority, by the user, to the system.  That is, the 
user who traditionally is seen as being in control of the system and ‘in-the-
loop’ (Weiner and Curry, 1980) accepts that the system is performing certain 
functions either without their full knowledge (e.g. a ‘blackbox’ scenario) or 
whilst they adopt a supervisory role.  However, this can lead to ‘out-of-loop’ 
situations where the operator is not fully-engaged in the task and may have 
diverted their attention to other activities but then be faced with taking back 
control at short notice and without fully understanding the current situation. 
 
A certain degree of transparency must exist, which Norman (1990) argues, is 
the operator’s ability to understand the automated systems and ‘see through’ 
the system’s processes.  Thus, the lower the transparency, the more 
removed the human is from the information processing which might have 
serious implications for situation awareness (SA). 
 
There are many theories of automation that suggest that the human should 
always have the final say in any decision involving safety (Billings, 1997; 
Woods, 1989; Stanton, Harris and Starr, 2015). Such a stance represents a 
user-centred approach to automation, whereby the human always has 
authority over the decision-making elements within the system. However, 
delegation of control authority has been outlined in theories of adaptive 
automation (Parasuraman, et al., 1992; Inagaki, 2003) whereby the system is 
authorised to make certain decisions on behalf of the human. An existing 
example of this is the demonstration of automotive collision avoidance 
braking systems (Coelingh, Eidehall and Bengtsson, 2010; Isermann, 
Mannale and Schimitt, 2010).  
  
The application of automation can be viewed in most domains as an attempt 
to reduce the workload burden of the operator whilst also offering a higher 
level of safety and efficiency. This is particularly valid in the aerospace 
domain, where over the last thirty years we have witnessed a revolution in 
automated flightdecks (Harris, 2011; Stanton, Harris and Starr, 2015). Of 
course, while there is a great deal of literature citing the benefits of 
increasing automation, there is evidence that highlights potential drawbacks. 
What we can conclude from the literature is that by increasing the level of 
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automation in an attempt to mitigate instances of human error, it may not 
eliminate it altogether. In fact what we are confronted with is a different type 
of human error borne out of the ironies of automation (Bainbridge, 1983). 
Again, we can look at examples in aerospace where incidents of automation 
bias (Mosier, et al., 1998) and automation surprise (Sarter, Woods and 
Billings, 1997) have been regarded as a confounding factor in many 
accidents.  As a consequence, it has been argued that automation should 
take on tasks for the pilot rather than instead of the pilot and support, rather 
than take over from the pilot (Stedmon and Selcon, 1996). 
 
For example, the tragic flight of Air France 447 in 2009 is testament to how a 
highly skilled flight crew can suddenly lose SA when a system is under 
automatic control. While cases such as these are rare, we are compelled to 
learn from them in order to assure that the same mistakes are not made 
again. 
 
It is important to compare those piloting aircraft (who are generally highly 
trained and monitored, working in a sector that is closely regulated, and with 
technologies maintained to a high standard), operating aircraft worth millions 
of pounds and owned by an aviation company (a party who measures the 
pilot’s actions in the interests of profit and safety and who themselves will be 
under international scrutiny) with those members of the public operating their 
own vehicles with differing degrees of training, responsibility and levels of 
maintenance for their own cars.  For example, young drivers in the fast 
moving, congested arterial roads during rush hour, who are using vehicles 
close to the end of their life cycles operate in a different context to those 
piloting aircraft. 
 
The importance of providing the user with a reasonable understanding of 
what the system is doing (and why) is essential, especially in instances 
where a system failure or change in situation demands occurs with little 
notice for the user to engage with recitifying the situation. Much like humans, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
systems can fail and are fallable (Reason, 2013). Therefore it is important 
that we do not stand in awe of such advanced systems but rather try to 
optimise the relationship in a safe and effective manner. 
 
3 Frameworks for delegating control authority  
Autonomous cars are sometimes, rather misleadingly, referred to as 
‘driverless’ vehicles. It is not about taking control from the driver, but allowing 
them to delegate authority to the system in a manner that they understand 
and feel comfortable with. To facilitate the interaction between the usder and 
the system a framework is required that defines the delegation of authority 
under a variety of different circumstances. 
 
The traditional model for defining the levels of automation was put forward by 
Sheridan and Verplank (1978), and later revised by Parasuraman, Sheridan 
and Wickens (2000). This framework (presented in Table 1) provides ten 
levels of automation distributed between the user and the system.  These 
range from the system making all decisions on behalf of the user (Level 10) 
to the human making all decisions (Level 1). 
 
Table 1:  Levels of Automation (Sheridan and Verplanck, 1978; 
Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens (2000) 
Level of 
Automation 
Description 
10 Fully autonomous: the automation system decides 
everything; acts autonomously, yet collaborating with other 
automation systems; ignores the human 
9 The automation system informs the human only if the system 
decides to 
8 The automation system informs the human, only if asked 
7 The automation system executes autonomously and then 
necessarily informs the human supervisor 
6 The automation system allows the human supervisor a 
restricted time to veto before automatic execution 
5 The automation system executes a suggestion if the human 
supervisor approves 
4 The automation system suggests one decision action 
alternative 
3 The automation system narrows the decision choice selection 
down to a few 
2 The automation system offers a complete set of 
decision/action alternatives 
1 The computer offers no assistance, the human must make all 
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decisions and take all actions 
 
It is possible to view this scale as a progressive range of delegation of control 
from the user to the system. There are various iterations of delegated 
authority between these two extremes and it thus provides us with a useful 
understanding of the type of interaction required.  
 
Within the aerospace domain there is a variation of this, whereby a pilot may 
delegate authority to the aircraft to perform some preordained tasks. This is 
referred to as the Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks (PACT) framework 
(presented in Table 2). Bonner, et al. (2000) outline the different levels of 
delegated authority that can exist between a user (e.g. the pilot) and a 
system that may be either highly automated or autonomous. 
 
Table 2:  The PACT Framework (Bonner, et al., 2000) 
Level of 
Automation 
Mode Operational 
Relationship 
Computer 
Autonomy 
Pilot 
Authority 
5 Automatic Automatic Full Interrupt 
4 Assisted Direct 
support 
Advised 
action unless 
revoked 
Revoking 
action 
3 Assisted In support Advice and, 
if authorised, 
action 
Acceptance 
of advice and 
authorising 
action 
2 Assisted Advisory Advice Acceptance 
of advice 
1 Assisted At call Advice only if 
required 
Full 
0 Commanded Under 
command 
None Full 
 
The PACT framework offers three basic modes of automation: fully 
automatic, assisted, and human command.  Balanced against this are 
operational relationship, computer autonomy and pilot authority factors that 
provide a rich understanding of how different levels of autonomy can be 
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assigned to different tasks (ranging from routine processes to safety critical 
events). 
 
Within the automotive sector there has been a similar push to address the 
levels of autonomy for driver-vehicle interaction. In the United States, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a Government 
Agency concerned with producing and enforcing regulatory standards for the 
highways, has defined several levels of autonomous driving (presented in 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3: NHTSA classification of vehicle automation 
Level of 
Automation 
Function Description 
4 Full self-driving 
automation 
Vehicle able to perform all 
safety-critical driving functions 
and monitor external conditions 
3 Limited self-driving 
automation 
The driver is able to cede all 
safety-critical functions to the 
vehicle in some instances 
2 Combined function 
automation 
At least two primary control 
systems are automated in order 
to assist the driver 
1 Function-specific 
automation 
One or more specific primary 
control systems utilise 
automation 
0 No automation Driver in control 
 
Using this classification we can clearly see that the majority of vehicle 
automation currently in development/operation (such as the Google system) 
may be viewed as adopting a function that is close to Level 3. 
 
It is important to develop a better understanding of how a driver interacts with 
an intelligent vehicle. This must allow for different levels of autonomy to 
generate the flexibility for a driver to delegate different levels of control to the 
system at different times.  However, this is a complex problem (illustrated in 
Table 4) even if we try to combine the elements of the previous models. 
 
Table 4: Combined elements of vehicle automation 
Level of 
Automation 
PACT 
Framework 
NHTSA 
classification 
Description incorporating  
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10 5 4 Fully autonomous; automatic; 
full self-driving automation 
9 5 4 The automation system 
informs the human only if the 
system decides to; automatic; 
full self-driving automation 
8 4 3 The automation system 
informs the human, only if 
asked; assisted; limited self-
driving automation 
7 4 3 The automation system 
executes autonomously and 
then necessarily informs the 
human supervisor; assisted; 
limited self-driving automation 
6 3 2 The automation system allows 
the human supervisor a 
restricted time to veto before 
automatic execution; assisted; 
combined function automation 
5 2 2 The automation system 
executes a suggestion if the 
human supervisor approves; 
assisted; combined function 
automation 
4 2 1 The automation system 
suggests one decision action 
alternative; assisted; function-
specific automation 
3 2 1 The automation system 
narrows the decision choice 
selection down to a few; 
assisted; function-specific 
automation 
2 1 1 The automation system offers 
a complete set of 
decision/action alternatives; 
assisted; function-specific 
automation 
1 0 0 The computer offers no 
assistance, the human must 
make all decisions and take all 
actions; commanded; no 
automation 
 
By comparing the elements from the different frameworks it is possible to 
identify areas of common understanding (indicated by the different zones of 
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shading in each column) and also to highlight where different interpretations 
of autonomy exist by those who might refer to one framework or another 
(indicated by different zones of shading across the rows).  This 
representation of the complexity of the models only goes so far in helping us 
understand the scope of the problem.  A key limitation is that it does not 
encompass the dynamic nature of automated processes where different 
levels of authority are required throughout a single driving experience. 
 
There may be instances that dictate the driver having full control of the 
vehicle (simply to allow the individual to choose when they want to drive) or 
opportunities for the vehicle to be controlled by the autonomous system. This 
would either be seen as a benefit in the reduction of frustration or workload of 
the driver, or perhaps the potential for the autonomous system to act as the 
supervisor of the driver (e.g. a training and/or safety feature). 
 
4 Control delegation in autonomous vehicles 
Building on the established knowledge we propose a model (presented in 
Figure 2) that highlights the relationship between the user and the vehicle in 
terms of control and the delegation of authority. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Model of control delegation between the driver and the car 
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It is possible to categorise manual (Driver Authority), semi-autonomous 
(Adaptive Assistance), and fully autonomous (Car Authority) modes. The shift 
in terms of control is seen as the balance of interaction between the driver 
and the car and the dynamic changes based on what level of control 
(direct/indirect) is delegated from the user to the system.  However, it is 
important to remember that in all instances the driver will be responsible for 
the safe operation of the car, regardless of the level of assistance that is 
engaged. 
 
It can be argued that with increasing levels of automation or decision support 
available to the user, it is equally important to provide the user with a better 
understanding of what the system is doing (Bainbridge, 1983; Norman, 
1990). The active monitoring of a highly automated system is cognitively 
demanding (Tsang and Johnson, 1989) and requires a high degree of 
vigilance on behalf of the user (Molloy and Parasuraman, 1996). In order to 
reduce the likelihood of human error it is important that the individual attains 
a sufficient level of SA pertaining to their situation and the context inwhich 
the system they are interacting with operates (Endsley, 1995 ; Endsley and 
Jones, 2012). Mental workload has also been cited as having a detrimental 
effect on human performance and safety (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). The 
potential for a lack of vigilance has been linked to a number of accidents 
(Warm, Parasuraman and Matthews, 2008).  Humans are poor at monitoring 
systems due to susceptibility of cognitive processing to switch off and miss 
stimuli where perceptual thresholds are low (Kantowitz and Sorkin, 1987). 
 
In these circumstances, espcially if the autonomous system operates in a 
way that is difficult for the user to understand (i.e. they are ‘out-of-the-loop’ or 
the system is not transparent but rather ‘opaque’), their mental model of the 
system is compromised.  This is particularly important in terms of evaluating 
when a mode error is made in automated systems (Lankenau, 2001) and 
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also in terms of subtle changes to the control delegation that the user may 
not even be aware of. 
 
Furthermore, in situations where the user is more of a supervisor of the 
automated vehicle rather than an active driver of the car, situations of mental 
underload can materialise.  This is a particularly problematic as it is very 
difficult to identify when someone is suffering from underload (Lavie, 2010). If 
mental workload is reduced and SA is maintained then the issue of 
monitoring the system suddenly becomes a critical aspect in using the 
system (Saxby, et al., 2013; Young and Stanton, 2002). 
To compensate for mental underload, the introduction of an interactive 
cognitive task can help to raise the effort required for the user to engage with 
the task both in terms of physiological measures of arousal and subjective 
assessment of alertness (Gershon, et al., 2011). By increasing cognitive 
effort, in terms of a secondary task, it is possible to maintain a level of 
attention that facilitates a degree of functional vigilance. 
 
Traditionally adaptive decision support systems have been used to provide 
assistance to users who need to make timely (and sometimes) safety-critical 
decisions whilst under great task demand or mental overload. For example, if 
we consider an adaptive automation system on the flightdeck the pilot might 
welcome a decision support system that would monitor user physiological 
indices for symptoms of mental overload. Similarly, an adaptive system could 
also monitor for signs of mental underload and provide cognitive cues (akin 
to an interactive cognitive task) in order to maintain levels of vigilance and 
alertness.  
 
A further aspect of a reliance on automation is that the reliability of such 
systems will degrade over time just as current mechanical ones do.  The 
design of the failure track is presumably part of the process for the systems 
engineers and it is important to consider the autonomy lifecycles so that 
systems are future proofed and potentially incorporate principles of graceful 
degradation so that the entire system is not vulnerable to complete failure.  
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5 Discussion 
With the advent of autonomous vehicles we are seeing a shift in the 
traditional role of the driver, but this does not diminish the driver’s 
responsibility; it merely changes how the driver interacts with the system and 
how vehicles are controlled. The majority of current use cases for 
autonomous cars place the user in the traditional setting of being in the 
driving seat in front of a steering wheel although the vehicle may well be 
oiperating without direct driver input (in essence ‘hands free’). However, that 
is not to say that the driver requires less opportunity to interact with the 
vehicle; in some instances we could argue that the driver requires more 
information of what is happening so that they maintain SA. As soon as the 
driver delegates control authority to the vehicle then this is more than a 
simple task shift, and a more complex interaction of trust, reliability and 
safety. In autonomous mode the driver no longer requires the traditional 
control interface with the vehicle. The placement of hands on the steering 
wheel and feet situated above pedals seems superfluous to the act of 
delegation. Indeed, when the vehicle is within autonomous mode the steering 
wheel and pedals act as means by which the driver may take control back 
from the system much like the way in which ADAS currently operates. 
However, there will still be a requirement for the driver to be supplied with 
appropriate cues for effectively monitoring and supervising the autonomous 
system. Some results have already suggested that users are willing to accept 
certain levels of delegated authority when it comes to safety. For example, 
Itoh, Horikome and Inagaki (2013) found drivers approved of a semi-
autonomous collision avoidance system that would present the driver with an 
auditory tone before performing a safety manoeuvre. 
 
Within the aviation domain the pilot and avionics systems interact to form a 
working team and just as a conventional team of humans operate, modern 
cockpits are characterised by trust in the system, functionality of team 
members, communication within the team, and where authority should be 
invested in the team (Taylor and Selcon, 1990; Stedmon and Selcon, 1996).  
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Taking examples from the highly automated flight deck there have been 
many instances of human error routed within failures of vigilance and a lack 
of SA. There are a number of psychological phenomena that have been cited 
as occurring in automated systems. These range from mode confusion, 
automation bias to automation surprise. 
  
Providing an increased level of support to the user by introducing automation 
and decision support has obvious benefits in terms of reducing cognitive load 
and reducing some elements of human error. However, Kantowitz and Sorkin 
(1987) observed that increasing levels of automation can leave the user 
human acting as a simple supervisor of the automated process.  Automation, 
in itself, may also requiring specific training and place new/additional 
demands on the user that direct task involvement may not.   
 
The technology that will facilitate the introduction of the autonomomus car 
has entered a phase of demonstration, with the Technology Readiness 
Levels (TRL) getting closer to market introduction. What is less mature is the 
associated understanding of how drivers will adopt to this new style of 
driving. We often view these systems as being intelligent and in some cases 
out-performing human abilities with little regard for the implicit nature of the 
sharing of the primary task and objective that in essence represents a shared 
goal between human and system (Baxter and Richards, 2010). On the 
occasion that the human is happy to delegate control to the system, thought 
is needed as to how to keep the user ‘in-the-loop’ in terms of maintaining SA. 
Good SA is essential not just for monitoring the system in terms of ensuring it 
is safe, but more so for predicate events that suddenly occur when there is a 
system failure or the system recommends or hands control back to the user. 
In such instances human trust in the system may very well lead to a 
dangerous degree of complacency (Bainbridge, 1983). As illustrated in other 
domains this is all too common and can lead to tragic consequences. This is 
why, for the foreseeable future, a driver of an autonomous car will be legally 
required to be paying attention to the road at all times (as is legally required 
in some of the US States that have already passed legislation). 
 
In order to facilitate discussion and research around these points, the Model 
of Control Delegation provides a framework for understanding aspects of the 
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dynamic and complex interactions that need to take place between the user 
and the system in order for seamless and effective autonomous driving 
scenarios to be developed on our roads. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The use of an autonomous car is not about taking control away from the 
driver, but allowing the driver to delegate authority to the system. This 
changes the nature of the driving role with the driver adopting a more 
supervisory approach to monitoring an intelligent system. In order for this 
interaction to be effective it is important to design the system that allows the 
user to understand not only what the system is currently doing (and plans to 
do) but also what the system is not able to do. This builds a partnership of 
trust between the user and the system that recognises not just human 
limitations but combines these with systemic limitations in order to determine 
a user-centred socio-technical system for autonomous driving.    
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